Abstract-We explicitly construct random hash functions for privacy amplification (extractors) that require smaller random seed lengths than the previous literature, and still allow efficient implementations with complexity O(n log n) for input length n. Firstly, we construct two types of hash functions by using the finite-filed. Then, concatenating them, we construct other two types of hash functions. We compare our hash functions with existing hash function in an asymptotic setting under a fixed key generation rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even when a random source at hand is partially leaked to an eavesdropper, one can amplify its secrecy by applying a random hash function. This process is called the privacy amplification. In this process, the amplification of secrecy is realized with the help of another auxiliary random source, which is public and is called a random seed. The random hash functions used for this purpose are often called extractors. There is also a similar but distinct process called two-sourcesextractors [8] when the auxiliary random sources is not public nor uniform. The most typical random hash function for these purposes is the universal 2 hash function [5] , [36] . There are many security theorems which assumes the use of the universal 2 hash function. In particular, the leftover hashing lemma [4] , [10] has several extensions and various applications in the classical and quantum setting [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [18] , [20] , [24] , [30] .
Privacy amplification has now become indispensable for guaranteeing the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) [3] , [16] , [17] , [24] . There are already many reports on its implementations [1] , [21] , [26] , as well as open software packages available [2] , [21] . So far most practical extractors are known to be universal 2 hash function, and the most widely used among them is the (modified) Toeplitz matrix, mainly because it can be implemented efficiently with complexity O(n log n) for input length n (see Appendix C of [37] , or Refs. [26] , [34] ). Here we note that the usual notion of efficiency (i.e., the algorithm finishes in polynomial time) is not sufficient, but a stricter criterion of the complexity being O(n log n) is desirable for QKD. This is because, for typical QKD systems, the finite size effect requires the input length n to be n ≥ 10
6 [16] , [17] , [31] , and thus algorithms that are efficient in the usual sense, e.g., O(n 2 ), are useless (for details, see Appendix B of [37] ).
Another important criterion for practical hash functions is how much randomness is required for the random seed. This can be measured in two ways, i.e., by the required length of a uniformly random seed, and also by the entropy of the seed. While the importance of minimizing the former is obvious, the latter is also equally important, since it is quite difficult to prepare a perfect random number generator for real cryptographic systems. Trevisan's extractor is known to realize exceptionally good performance in terms of these criteria [6] , [33] , but also has as a drawback that its computational complexity is larger than O(n log n) of the Toeplitz case (for details, see [21] and Appendix B of of [37] ).
The main goal of this paper is to construct explicitly random hash functions for privacy amplification that require smaller random seed lengths than in the previous literature, and still allow efficient implementations with complexity O(n log n) for input length n.
Our construction consists of four types of hash functions. We first present f F1,R suitable for m/n ≥ 1/2, and f F2,R suitable for m/n ≤ 1/2, both requiring seed length n−m for input and output lengths n and m. Then by concatenating f F2,R and its dual f ⊥ F2,R , we construct f F3,R and f F4,R which require seed length m asymptotically. In order to demonstrate that hash functions f F1,R , . . . , f F4,R can indeed be implemented efficiently with complexity O(n log n), we also give a set of explicit algorithms in Appendix D of [37] . This algorithm set uses multiplication algorithm for finite field F 2 k developed, e.g., in Refs. [19] , [27] , and works for parameter k satisfying certain conditions related to Artin's conjecture [28, Chap. 21] . We numerically check the existence of so many such integers up to k 10 50 , and thus the algorithm can be applied to most practical cases.
As to comparisons with the existing methods: Trevisan [33] proposed another random hash function, whose security in the quantum case was studied by [6] , and software performance in [21] . Papers [22] , [32] also proposed other random hash functions. As is also summarized in Table I , the comparison with our hash function is given in an asymptotic setting under a fixed key generation rate. 
Hash functions using Toeplitz matrix O(n log n)
Trevisan's extractor [6] , [21] , [33] poly(n)
Hash functions in the TSSR paper [32] O(n log n)
-almost pairwise independent hash function [22] poly(n)
Strong blender (classical) [7] poly(n)
Parameter n is the length of the input to the hash function, and is the security level (L 1 distinguishability) of the final key. Parameters h, t, α, γ are defined in order to compare the six schemes for a case where the random seeds are uniformly random: t is the required minimum entropy for the input to a hash function, αn the output length, h the required length of random seeds, and γ a constant in (0, 1]. We mainly choose γ > 1/2. f F3,R is a hash function for the classical case. f F4,R is its quantum modification. * The paper [32] did not evaluate the computational complexity. However, when we employ our construction of finite filed given in Appendix D of [37] , we find that the computational complexity of the random hash function is O(n log n).
1) Our random hash functions, f F1,R , . . . , f F4,R and g n,l,m , and those of Ref. [32] have an efficient algorithm with complexity O(n log n) for input length n. On the other hand, Ref. [7] only considers algorithms typically with complexity O(n 3 ), and Ref. [22] with poly(n). For Trevisan's random extractor, the complexity of the actual calculation (besides pre-computations) is only shown to be polynomial in n, and indeed large in practice as demonstrated in [21] (also, see Appendix B of [37] ). Although our random hash functions require a search for an integer k mentioned above, it should be noted that k of a desired size up to k 10 50 can be found in less than a second, and thus our random hash functions practically have no pre-computation. 2) When the random seeds are uniformly random, we also compare the required length h of random seeds, and the required minimum entropy t of the input to the hash function, as is summarized in Table I . Here we denote the input and output lengths by n and m, their ratio by α := m/n, and the security level (L 1 distinguishability) of the final key by .
• When both α and are constant, all random hash functions have almost the same required minimum input entropy t. While Trevisan's random extractor [6] , [33] has the minimum value for the required length h of random seeds, the computational complexity is O(poly(n)) and also requires a pre-computation. Our hash function f F1,R , f F2,R or f F3,R , f F4,R realizes the next minimum value dependently of α, and can be implemented efficiently with O(n log n) and with virtually no precomputation.
• Next, we consider the case where α is constant and is exponentially small with respect to n; that is, we assume that behaves as e In this case our random hash function f F1,R , f F2,R or f F3,R , f F4,R achieves the minimum values of the required length h of random seeds and the required minimum input entropy t at least in the first order n, dependently of α. (See Section VI-D of [37] for comparison in other regions). This paper covers the security against quantum leaked information as well as non-quantum (i.e., classical) leaked information. However, it should be noted that this paper is organized so that it can be understood without quantum knowledges. Discussions with quantum terminologies are given only in Subsection II-B. The term "quantum" appearing in other parts of the paper can be replaced by "classical," if the reader is interested only in the non-quantum case. Further, this paper discusses only the case with uniform random seeds due to the page limitation. However, our result can be extended to the case with non-uniform random seeds, which is discussed in the arXiv version [37] .
The rest of this paper is organized as as follows. In Section II, we introduce the security criterion for random number. Section III introduces our new random hash functions f F1,R , . . . , f F4,R , and g n,l,m , and give their security as Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4. We can derive the first three items in Table 1 based on these theorems, whose detail derivation is available in Section VI of [37] . The remaining items are also shown in Section VI of [37] . The proofs and the subalgorithms required for our new random hash functions f F1,R , . . . , f F4,R , and g n,l,m are given in the paper [37] and its appendices.
II. SECURITY CRITERION FOR RANDOM NUMBER

A. Classical case
In order to discuss the security problem, we prepare several information quantities for a joint distribution P A,E on the sets A and E, and another distribution Q E on E. The conditional min entropy are given as [24] H min (A|E|P A,E Q E ) := − log max
Then, we introduce criteria for the amount of the information leaked from Alice's secret random number A to Eve's random variable E for joint distribution P A,E . Using the L 1 norm, we can evaluate the secrecy for the state P A,E as follows:
That is, the secrecy is measured by the difference between the true distribution P A,E and the ideal distribution P A × P E . In order to take the randomness of A into account, Renner [24] also defines another type of the L 1 distinguishability criteria for security of the secret random number A:
where P U,A is the uniform distribution with respect to the random variable A. This quantity can be regarded as the difference between the true distribution P A,E and the ideal distribution P U,A × P E . It is known that this security criterion is universally composable [25] . Using the above quantity, we give the following definition for a random hash function f R .
Definition 1: A random hash function f R from F n 2 to F m 2 is called a (t, )-classical strong extractor if any distribution P A with the minimum entropy H min (A) ≥ t satisfies
where P Um is the uniform distribution on F m 2 . Indeed, the above condition is equivalent with the following condition for a random hash function f R . A distribution P A,E satisfies
when H min (A|E|P A,E ) ≥ t.
B. Quantum case
The contents of the previous sections can be generalized to the quantum case. When given a state ρ A,E in the composite system H A ⊗ H E and a state σ E in the system H E , Renner [24] defined the conditional minimum entropy as
Renner (and others) also introduced the L 1 distinguishability criteria for security of the secret random number A:
where ρ mix,A is the completely mixed state. This quantity can be regarded as the difference between the true state ρ A,E and the ideal state ρ mix,A ⊗ρ E . It is known that the security criteria with respect to this quantity is universally composable [25] . The concept of (t, )-classical strong extractor can be generalized as follows.
is called a (t, )-quantum strong extractor when the following condition holds. A classical-quantum state ρ A,E satisfies
when there exists a state σ E on H E such that
Since the classical case of the previous subsection is a special case this quantum extension, any quantum strong extractor also works as a classical strong extractor with the same parameter. Thus, if the reader is interested only in the classical case, he/she can always replace "quantum" strong extractor with "classical" strong extractor. Similarly, a "classical (quantum) extractor," appearing sometimes in what follows, may be interpreted either as a quantum or a classical extractor according to one's purpose.
III. RANDOM HASH FUNCTIONS WITH SHORTER SEEDS
Many of existing random hash functions, such as the one using the Toeplitz matrix (see Appendix B of [37] ) and finite fields [29] , require random seed R of the same length as the input length. The strong blender by [7] also shares this drawback. The TSSR paper [32] succeeded in reducing the seed length to 2m asymptotically. Trevisan's extractor requires even a smaller seed length of O(log 3 n), but it requires a heavier computational complexity O(poly(n)) than O(n log n) common to other methods (see Table I ).
In this section, we will shorten the seed length to min(m, n − m) asymptotically. For this purpose we present four types of random hash functions. First we present f F1,R suitable for m/n ≥ 1/2, and f F2,R suitable for m/n ≤ 1/2, both requiring seed length n−m. Then by concatenating f F2,R and its dual f ⊥ F2,R , we construct f F3,R and f F4,R which require seed length m.
We note that f F1,R , . . . , f F4,R can all be implemented efficiently with complexity O(n log n). A set of example algorithms using techniques of Refs. [27] , [19] is given in Appendix D of [37] .
A. Random hash function f F1,R
We begin by presenting a hash function, f F1,R , which is suitable for compression rate α = m/n ≥ 1/2 and requires random seed length n − m. l−1 , and f r are defined as
It is easy to see that this random hash function indeed fits in our setting using generating and parity check matrices. Consider a matrix representation M of a finite field F 2 m over F 2 , then f r can be rewritten as linear functions over F 2 . The corresponding generating matrix can be chosen as G(r) = (A(r)|I m ) with A(r) defined as
where M (r i ) are m × m matrices representing r i ∈ F 2 m (see, Appendix A of [37] ). Therefore, the required amount of random seeds is (l − 1)m bits. When we implement the modified Toeplitz matrix with the same size, we need lm − 1 bits. When l = 2, the random hash function f F1,R requires the half random seeds of the random seeds required by the modified Toeplitz matrix. Theorem 1: When the random variable R is uniformly distributed, the random hash function f F1,R is (t, 2
We can also show that the random hash function f F1,R with l = 2 has the minimum amount of the seed randomness under the condition n = 2m (See [37] ).
B. Random hash function f F2,R
Next we present a hash function, f F2,R , which is suitable for compression rate α = m/n ≤ 1/2 and again requires random seed length n − m. l . We choose the uniform random seeds R to be r ∈ F 2 n−m . Then, f F2,r are defined as
Note that practical hash functions typically require random seed of length n or 2m. Hence, particularly when the ratio n−1 m is large, f F2,R saves the amount of random seeds very much. The hash function f F2,R is in fact the dual of the well known universal hash function using polynomials.
Lemma 1:
The random hash function f F2,R is characterized by the following theorem:
Theorem 2: When the random variable R is uniformly distributed, the random hash function f F2,R is a (t, By concatenating f F2,R and its dual, f ⊥ F2,R , we can also construct secure hash functions, g n,l,m,R , f F3,R and f F4,R . The seed lengths of these extractors are m asymptotically.
1) Evaluations for general values of t:
We first define a concatenated extractor g n,l,m,R , and give a security evaluation valid for general value of t, the minimum entropy of the input.
Definition 5: We define a random hash function g n,l,m,R := f F2,l,m,R1 • f ⊥ F2,n,n−l,R2 : F n 2 → F m 2 for m < l < n. This random hash function requires 2l − m-bit uniform random seeds. Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Suppose that the random variable R is given as the combination (R 1 , R 2 ) of two independent uniform random numbers R 1 and R 2 . Then g n,l,m,R is a (t, c )-classical strong extractor, and simultaneously, a (t, q )-quantum strong extractor, where
2) Minimizing seed lengths for a fixed value of t: Next we consider a situation where the minimum entropy t of the input is known, and adjust parameters l and η so that the seed length of g n,l,m,R is minimized. A short calculation shows that it is minimized for l = t in the classical case, and for l = in the quantum case. Hence we define the corresponding hash functions as follows.
Definition 6: For a given value of t, we define f F3,R := g n,t,m,R : F Then we have the following theorem. Theorem 4: Suppose that the random variable R is given as the combination (R 1 , R 2 ) of two independent uniform random numbers R 1 and R 2 . Then f F3,R is a (t, 3 )-classical strong extractor, and f F4,R : F 
IV. CONCLUSION
We have proposed new random hash functions f F1,R , . . . , f F4,R using a finite field with a large size. The proposed method realizes the two advantages simultaneously. First, it requires the smallest length of random seeds. Second, there exist efficient algorithms for them achieving the calculation complexity of the smallest order, namely O(n log n). Note that no previously known methods, such as the one using the modified Toeplitz matrix, as well as those given in Refs. [6] , [22] , [32] , can realize these two at the same time.
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